Multi-period risk functionals assign a risk value to discrete-time stochastic processes. While convexity and monotonicity extend in straightforward manner from the singleperiod case, the role of information is more problematic in the multi-period situation. In this paper, we define multi-period functionals in such a way that the development of available information over time (expressed as a filtration) enters explicitly the definition of the functional. This allows to define and study the property of information monotonicity, i.e. monotonicity w.r.t. increasing filtrations. On the other hand, time consistency of valuations is a favorable property and it is well known that this requirement essentially leads to compositions of conditional mappings. We demonstrate that generally spoken the intersection of time consistent and information monotone valuation functionals is rather sparse, although both classes alone are quite rich. In particular the paper gives a necessary and sufficient condition for information monotonicity of additive compositions of positively homogeneous risk/acceptability mappings. Within the class of distortion functionals only compositions of expectation or essential infima are information monotone. Furthermore, we give a sufficient condition and examples for compositions of nonhomogeneous mappings exhibiting information monotonicity.
Introduction
Information is an important issue in economic literature for more than 40 years, see e.g. the important book by the Nobel Laureate J. Stiglitz [34] . Information economics is based on the fundamental consent that information has a value or price. The processing, transfer and use of information, as well as the consequences of information costs on classical economic results, such as the "fundamental theorem of welfare economics" or the "law of the single price", was deeply analyzed over the last decades.
The idea that information has a value is also important in the field of stochastic optimization, where it expresses the amount, a rational decision maker would be willing to pay (in terms of his objective function) to reveal or partly reveal uncertain quantities before taking a decision (see [29, 33] ). Clearly, this is closely related to the view of information economics (e.g. [15] ).
Consequently, the effects of information should be taken into account by any quantification of risk or acceptability: if a functional measuring the acceptability of economic undertakings gives higher values in more informed situations, it will be called information monotone. Violation of this principle results in the strange situation that the same process is acceptable for some information pattern, but not acceptable, if more information is available at some point in time. Or to put it differently: if a functional is not information monotone, then hiding or neglecting information could make acceptable an a priori unacceptable undertaking.
On the other hand, many papers see time-consistency as an important issue. This property basically means that valuations of an outcome process at different times do not contradict each other. Different definitions have been proposed in literature, but throughout this paper we follow [30, 6, 9, 35, 20, 7] . In this approach time consistency is practically equivalent to recursivity, which means that the functional is a composition of conditional mappings (for details see [2] , [20] , [1] ).
Both properties, time consistency and information monotonicity are present in large classes of multi-period valuation functionals: recursive constructions lead to time consistency, while -as a typical example -the optimal values of information constrained stochastic optimization problems are information monotone. Although both classes are rather fundamental, we will demonstrate in this paper that it is hard to achieve information monotonicity for time consistent valuation functionals.
The main results of this paper are a necessary and sufficient condition for information monotonicity of compositions of positively homogeneous acceptability mappings and a sufficient condition for compositions of nonhomogeneous acceptability mappings. The method of proofs relies heavily on conjugate representations of concave functionals. Particular interesting examples of the homogeneous case will be compositions of distortion functionals, a class of functionals which is important in the context of valuation in insurance.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 information monotonicity and time consistency is discussed informally, in particular we analyze the basic question of the paper and an important argument used later in the proofs. The following sections are written in a more rigorous style. Section 3 reviews the fundamental properties of multi-period functionals and conditional mappings and formally defines information monotonicity, valuation sequences, and time consistent. Additionally, some basic
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Are time consistent valuations information monotone ? 3 properties related to information monotonicity and time consistency are discussed. The main results of the paper are contained in sections 4 and 5: section 4 analyzes information monotonicity of compositions of positively homogeneous acceptability mappings, with compositions of distortion functionals as an important special case. Section 5 deals with information monotonicity of compositions of nonhomogeneous mappings. Finally, the appendices give some additional technical background.
Information Monotonicity and Time Consistency
Suppose we want to valuate a stochastic process Y = (Y 1 , . . . Y T ) -e.g. representing future prices of some commodities or securities, related cash flows, or a wealth process -with respect to its acceptability or risk. Acceptability and risk are the different sides of the same coin: risk is negative acceptability and we may use these two terms practically simultaneously. We are in particular interested in two aspects, information monotonicity and time consistency, of such valuations. Both notions will be rigorously defined and analyzed in sections 3-5, but for the moment we will start with an informal discussion.
A basic relaxation argument
A very general method for defining information monotone functionals is based on the observation that in real world decision problems the valuation of stochastic processes influencing the success of a business line or a project is undissolvably amalgamated with the decisions that can be taken in order to control the process and its wealth or risk. Therefore, it is natural to base the valuation on optimal decisions in the following way.
Suppose that in addition to observing the process Y, it is possible to take actions x = (x 0 , . . . , x T −1 ), considered as (random) decisions with values in R m . Furthermore, let H (x 0 , Y 1 , x 1 , Y 2 , . . . , x T −1 , Y T ) denote a profit function, which is concave w.r.t. the decisions x. In this framework, constraints on x can be included in the function H, defining H (x 0 , Y 1 , x 1 , Y 2 , . . . , x T −1 , Y T ) = −∞ for values of x that are not feasible. For some filtration, i.e. an increasing sequence of σ-fields F=(F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F T ) representing the observable relevant information, define a multiperiod valuation functional by
Here, x t F t -the so called nonanticipativity constraints -denotes measurability of x t with respect to the σ-field F t . This assumption refers to the fact that decisions at time t have to be based on information available at or before time t.
Any decision problem -e.g. optimal production, transportation, asset allocation or hedging -can be related to an optimization problem of the form (2.1). If H is monotone and concave in the Y t 's then the functional A is also monotone and concave, hence a multi-period valuation functional in the sense of section 3 below. Replace now the filtration F in (2.1) by a finer filtration F = F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F T , i.e. use F t ⊆ F t , but keep the underlying probability space the same. This leads to
which is just a relaxation of (2.1), i.e. a problem with a larger feasible set.
Let us illustrate this for the case that all σ-fields are finite: denote a set Γ ⊆ F t as atom if no proper subset is contained in F. The nonanticipativity constraints x t F t can be reformulated by requiring that the decisions at stage t must be identical on the atoms, i.e. the constraints
must hold for all atoms Γ. In other words: if the decision maker has not enough information to distinguish two different scenarios, then the decision must be the same for both of them. For a more informative filtration F some σ-field F t will contain all atoms of the σ-field F t but also at least two additional disjoint atoms Γ 1 , Γ 2 , such that Γ 1 ⊂ Γ and Γ 2 ⊂ Γ for some atom Γ of F t . When nonanticipativity constraints are formulated for the new atom, the constraints (2.3) related to Γ are replaced by the weaker constraints related to Γ 1 and Γ 2 separately, which leads to a relaxation. Clearly, the optimal value of a relaxed problem is larger than or equal to the optimal value of the original problem and hence the optimal value functional A in (2.1), interpreted as a function of the filtration F, is information monotone. The difference A(Y|F ) − A(Y|F) is nonnegative and can be seen as the value of additional information. The idea of information monotonicity was introduced e.g. in Hirshleifer and Riley [15] . At that time it was called information dominance and was formulated without recourse to filtrations.
The most relaxed version of the original problem is the so called clairvoyantproblem
Here the decisions are only restricted by the information available at the end of the planning horizon. The differenceÂ(Y|F ) − A(Y|F) measures the value of having the full information available at any point in time. Differences of this kind were introduced by Raiffa and Schlaifer [29] under the name of expected value of perfect information and have a long history in stochastic optimization (see e.g. [33] ).
Some caveats
While the statement of the relaxation argument -that more information leads to an improved optimal value -is fundamental, some caveats should be kept in mind: it is important to observe the above condition, that both, the state space and the probability measure should be not changed when introducing the refined filtration and that F t ⊆ F t .
Violating this principle may easily destroy the relaxation argument, because introducing new states (together with related values), and reassigning probabilities leads to a completely different optimization problem that is not a relaxation any more. Hence, the "refined" filtration may worsen the optimal value in this case. For an early paper that analyzes the effect of information without using the concept of finer filtrations see [21] .
Note also that the relaxation argument only works if applied to an optimization problem (2.1) and its global optimum. Local optima or heuristic solutions easily can become worse, if a refined σ-field is introduced.
We finally remark that the relaxation argument is built on a basic property of optimization problems and can not be extended to game theoretic situations, or more generally to problems related to saddle points. Relaxed constraints can lead to equilibria that are worse for both participants. If the basic probability space can be extended, examples similar to the Braess-paradoxon may be found (see [14] ).
The basic question
In the main part of the paper we will not refer to decision problems but will focus on the properties of generic multiperiod acceptability functionals, that can be used independently of a special decision context. In particular, our main results will be formulated in terms of (concave, convex, and even translation equivariant) acceptability functionals and mappings (see [26, 31] ), also known as monetary utility functions (e.g. [16] ). It should be kept in mind that up to sign, such functionals are identical with convex risk measures ( [12] , [13] ). Despite this restriction to generic valuation functionals we will see that the main arguments will build heavily on a generalization of the relaxation argument discussed above.
While information monotonicity is a property of multiperiod valuation functionals, time consistency is a property of valuation sequences, i.e. valuations of the future development of a process at each point in time. Based on the literature discussed in the introduction, the technical definition is given in Definition 3.3. Basically, time consistent valuation sequences prefer a process X over a process Y (both defined on the same probability space with identical information structure (filtration)) at time t − 1, if it prefers X to Y at time t and X ≥ Y a.s. at time t − 1.
It is well known that time consistency is (under quite general circumstances) equivalent to the presence of a recursive structure, i.e. the valuation at any time t can be reformulated as the composition of a valuation at time t and a valuation at time t + 1 (see [2] or [20] tional expectation operators lead to time consistency and the resulting valuation over the whole planning horizon is information monotone. The same holds true, when conditional expectation is applied to a utility process, which means that expected utility also fulfills both criteria. Unfortunately, expectation is information monotone only in a trivial sense: if two processes are distinguishable only by their respective filtrations, their expectations are equal, hence the inequality in Definition 3.3 holds always with equality. Therefore we extend the analysis to the broader class of acceptability functionals.
The following simple counterexamples show that it is easy to construct information monotone valuations that are not time consistent, and time consistent valuation sequences that are not information monotone. Both examples use the average value at risk, resp. its conditional version, which will be an important building block throughout the rest of this paper.
The average value at risk with parameter α is a special case of (2.1) for T = 1.
It is well known (see [27] 
The name average value-at-risk is due to Foellmer and Schied, but the same functional is also called expected shortfall or conditional value-at-risk. It is the concave minorant of the (nonconvex) value at risk, i.e. the largest concave functional dominated by the value at risk functional.
The first counterexample shows a sequence of perfectly information monotone valuation functionals that nevertheless is not time consistent.
Example 2.1.
In view of (2.5) the valuation of the full tree, using the average value at risk AV@R 0.1 for valuing random payments, is information monotone by the relaxation argument. For a full proof see [26] , Proposition 3.10. However, we will use Figure 1 to show that valuation sequences consisting of (conditional) versions of AV@R are not time consistent. We will discuss conditional versions of the AV@R in section 3.2. For the moment it suffices to identify filtrations with the tree structure of probability trees. In this setup we may calculate the conditional AV@R of the random variables X and Y at each node of the respective tree by calculating the (unconditional) AV@R of these random variables, restricted to the respective subtree. For this the related conditional probabilities have to be used.
In this manner one sees that at time 1 that is X is preferred over Y . Nevertheless at time 0, since
Y is preferred over X, which contradicts time consistency. Further examples can be fornulated easily. For instance, multistage models which minimize the final variance under a mean constraint (e.g. [23] , [36] ) are informationmonotone but time-inconsistent.
While we already know that time consistency can easily be achieved by compositions of conditional mappings, the second counterexample shows that this construction may immediately violate information monotonicity. Example 2.2. (see [20] ) Compositions of conditional mappings will be introduced formally in section 3.3. In our simple tree setup without intermediate payoffs, and based on the AV@R α , compositions are calculated as follows: for each leaf-node the value of the composition is just the value of the random variable related to this node. For any other node the value of the composition is given by the AV@R of the compositional values calculated for all the successor nodes of the node under consideration. Again, the calculation uses the related conditional probabilities. This is a recursive construction and hence the resulting composition in the root node is time consistent. However, such compositions are not information monotone in general: consider Figure 2 : a final random payoff Y at time t = 2 is shown under two alternative filtrations F and F , represented by the two probability trees. Both processes are valuated under the same probability measure, defined by the probabilities assigned to the leaf nodes, but the information structure (filtration) is different: for the second case (the finer filtration F ) a decision maker has available more information (i 1 ,i 2 ) about the final outcome at stage 1 than in the first case (the coarser filtration F). This may result from an additional process, observable in the second case but not in the first. 
Fig. 2. Two trees with identical final payoff (assigned to the leaf nodes) and consistent conditional probabilities (assigned to the edges). The left tree however has a coarser (less informative) filtration than the right one.
Within the discussed framework the main question of the paper can be restated: which compositions of acceptability mappings are also information monotone?
The classical relaxation arguments, is based purely on the relaxation of nonanticipativity constraints. The key arguments of sections 4 and 5 will generalize this by analyzing the concave Fenchel-Moreau conjugate representations of compositions and by observing the behaviour of the related constraint sets with respect to changes in the underlying filtration. In the context of positively homogeneous acceptability functionals (section 4) it will show that information monotonicity is valid if and only if a reformulation as an optimization problem is possible, such that a finer filtration leads to a relaxation. For non-homogeneous functionals the picture is more complex, but nevertheless the relaxation argument will be part of the necessary conditions derived in section 5.
Valuation Functionals
Throughout this paper we will use (possibly indexed) upper case characters to denote random variables, e. 
Here, E[·] denotes the expectation operator. We will use the short notation
In order to model the evolution of information over time, we define F as the family of all filtrations of length T + 1 in
Typically, F t can be larger than the σ-field generated by (Y 1 , . . . , Y t ). This is evident if one considers final processes of the form (0, . . . , 0, Y T ). Here the σ-field generated by Y is trivial up to time T − 1, but it might be possible to collect nontrivial information at times 0, . . . , T − 1. For this reason, we will conceptually separate the available information from the observed values, and define acceptability functionals A on pairs (Y|F) consisting of an observable process Y and a filtration F.
Multi-period Valuation Functionals and Information Monotonicity
Consider functionals A that map the elements Y ∈ Y and filtrations F to the extended real line R = R ∪ {−∞}. We will assume that those functionals are proper (i.e., for every filtration
Such functionals will be called probability functionals in the following. A probability functional A : Y × F → R with values A(Y|F) is called multiperiod valuation functional if it satisfies the following properties for any filtration F ∈ F: In order to define the property of information monotonicity we introduce a partial order ≤ between filtrations F = (F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F T ) and F = (F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F T ): We write F ≺ F if at least one inclusion is strict in (3.1).
Within this setup and following [26] we define the property of information monotonicity:
Functionals which do not depend on the filtration (like
are information monotone in a trivial sense. However they fail to be strictly monotone.
If A = A(· |F) is a multi-period valuation functional with nonempty domain, its conjugate A + (· |F) : Z → R obtained from the Legendre-Fenchel transform is given by
Note that A + (· |F) is again proper and concave. If A(· |F) is upper semicontinuous, the Rockafellar-Fenchel-Moreau theorem implies
Furthermore, if the infimum is attained in (3.4) i.e.
which is closed and convex. We call S = domA + the supergradient hull of A, since it is the convex hull of the supergradient set. It is well known that property (MA2) implies that S(F) ⊂ {Z ∈ Z : Z t ≥ 0}.
Remark 3.2. Notice that A(Y|F) is information monotone, if and only if its conjugate A
+ (Y|F) is information antitone, i.e. fulfills (3.2) with reversed inequality sign. This can be seen easily from the relations (3.3) and (3.4).
The following Lemma shows that the operation of sup-convolution has a special role for information monotone multi-period valuation functionals. Recall the definition of sup-convolution
Lemma 3.1. The family of all information monotone valuation functionals forms a convex cone, which is closed under sup-convolution.
Proof. Notice that if both functionals A 1 and A 2 fulfill (MA1) and (MA2), the same is true for their sup-convolution. The convex cone property follows directly
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Are time consistent valuations information monotone? 11 from the defining properties of acceptability functionals. Closedness under supconvolution follows from the basic property
since the sum is information antitone, if both summands are information antitone.
Conditional Acceptability Mappings and Information Monotonicity
Conditional acceptability mappings will be used as the basic building blocks for constructing an important class of time consistent multi-period valuation functionals.
In the following we use spaces Y and Y , where both Y and Y are closed subspaces of some space L 1 (Ω, F, P ) with F ⊆ F and Y ⊆ Y . All equations and inequalities involving random variables are understood in the sense of "valid almost surely" (a.s.), and inf denotes the infimum with respect to the partial order based on ≤ a.s. Following the basic setup in [26, 18, 17, 11] conditional acceptability mappings with observable information F are upper semicontinuous (in the sense of ( [24] , [ In the following we restrict ourself to conditional acceptability mappings with conjugate mapping
representable by a dual representation 8) where inf denotes the infimum w.r.t. the ordering based on ≤ a.s. It has the conjugate representation
Any minimizer of (3.8) is called a supergradient of A at Y . See [17, 11] 
for all B ∈ F and Y ∈ Y.
A necessary and sufficient condition for this property for positive homogeneous mappings is given by the following Lemma. Proof. Let F ⊆ F. Suppose S(F ) ⊇ S(F). Then information monotonicity follows from
Conversely, suppose that S(F ) ⊇ S(F). Then there is a Z ∈ S(F) \ S(F ). By convex separation, one may find a
Z ∈ S(F )} and A cannot be information monotone.
The notion of sup-convolution extends in an obvious manner (e.g. [22] ) to conditional acceptability mappings:
where the supremum is understood in the almost sure sense. Proof. The first assertion is trivial, the second follows from the fact that 
where
Example 3.2. Supergradient hulls of the form
for some set A and measurable function φ i , lead to information monotone positive homogeneous mappings. In particular the conditional AV@R α (see Example 2.2) is information monotone, as well as any convex combination of AV@R αi 's. 
for some nonnegative, monotonically decreasing function h. Regular distortions form a broad subclass of conditional positively homogeneous information monotone acceptability functionals.
Time Consistency of Valuation Functionals
As above, let Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y T ) ∈ Y be a stochastic process with Y t ∈ Y t and F a filtration, which is fixed for the moment. We denote by Y (t) = (Y t , . . . , Y T ) and F (t) = (F t , . . . , F T ) the truncated sequences. Consider now sequences of functionals
Y j to Y t , assigning a F t -measurable random variable to the truncated process of length T − t, which results in a stochastic process of valuations. If the mappings are jointly concave and monotone, we call them multiperiod valuation mappings and the whole sequence a valuation sequence.
While information monotonicity is a property of multi-period valuation functionals, time consistency is a property of valuation sequences and can be defined as follows (see also the related definitions in [2] , [7] , for weaker concepts: [35] ): 
for all t and any Y (t) ∈ × T j=t Y t . Time consistency and recursivity are basically two sides of the same coin: we say that a mapping A (t) (·|F (t) ) has the weak projection property if Y t+1 F t implies that
It has been shown (see [2] , [20] ) that a valuation sequence
with all components A (t) (·|F (t) ) fulfilling the weak projection property is time consistent if and only if it is recursive.
A special case of recursive -and therefore time consistent -sequences are additive acceptability compositions (the idea goes back to ([32])). . . . , Y T ) be a stochastic process with Y t ∈ Y t and let A t (·|F t ), t = 0, . . . , T − 1 be a sequence of conditional acceptability mappings. We define the composition A t (Y (t+1) |F (t) ) as 12) and for the complete composition (which is an unconditional functional) A(Y|F) :=
). If all of the mappings A t (·|F t ) are conditional acceptability mappings we call the composition A(Y|F) an additive acceptability composition. Remark 3.3. By predictable translation equivariance (CA3), compositions can be equivalently defined in a stepwise manner
and
for t < T − 1. probability. In this case we set the function value equal to −∞ almost surely, and require A(−∞|F) = −∞. In this way the composition leads to finite results only if functionals with appropriate domains and ranges were chosen.
The following representation (see [17] and [18] , Theorem 5.2.6, Corollary 5.2.7) holds for the additive composition of acceptability mappings and will be important throughout the rest of this paper. Its proof is repeated in Appendix B.
Proposition 3.1. Let (A t ) t∈{1,...,T −1} be a collection of monotone, concave probability mappings with T ≥ 2. Then for F 0 ⊂ F 1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ F the related acceptability composition A (Y|F) can be represented in the following way:
appearing in (3.13) is not necessarily identical to the conjugate functional of A: The latter is the concave majorant of (3.14), i.e. the smallest concave functional that dominates (3.14).
Using the martingale property, it is possible to rewrite the representation in the following way.
is the family of all probability densities w.r.t. P .
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Information monotonicity of compositions of positively homogeneous mappings
We start our analysis of compositions by studying compositions of positively homogeneous information monotone acceptability mappings. Notice that positive homogeneous acceptability mappings are fully characterized by the mappings F t → S t (F t ). From Proposition 3.1 it follows that such compositions can be represented as
For a sequence (A t ) of conditional mappings with supergradient hulls S t and a filtration F we define the following related sequence (M t ) t=0,...,T of sets:
for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, where for two sets of random variables V, W the Minkowski-type (pointwise) product V · W is defined as
Remark 4.1. Throughout this paper we will use × for the cartesian product of sets (and × i for its repetition) and · for the ordinary multiplication between reals or random variables, as well as for the Minkowski-type product. For random vectors · refers to the scalar product. Repetition of the ordinary or Minkowski-type multiplication is denoted by i .
Note that the Z t 's from representation (3.13) are elements of S t−1 , while the M t = t i=1 Z i are elements of M t−1 . We may rewrite (4.1) in simpler form
(4.5)
Within our framework, information monotonicity can be characterized in the following way: Proposition 4.1. Let A (Y|F) be a composition of information monotone, positively homogeneous conditional acceptability mappings A t with supergradient hulls S t (·). The composition is information monotone if and only if
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Strict information monotonicity is achieved if and only if ⊂ holds instead of ⊆ for some t in (4.6).
Proof. We show first that condition (4.6) is necessary. Consider a filtration F = (F t ) t=0,...,T . Then fix a point in time t 0 , and define a modified filtration F , where F t0 is replaced by F t0 = F t0−1 , and all other σ-fields F t , t = t 0 remain unchanged.
A representation of the mapping with modified σ-fields F is given by
where M t = M t for t < t 0 , and 
Using this argument, and comparing (4.5) and (4.7), we see that information monotonicity
holds for all t ≥ t 0 . Furthermore, (4.10) is equivalent to
as we show now: (4.10) follows trivially from (4.11). For the other direction choose
Inequality (4.10) then implies that there are Z 0 ∈ M t0−2 , Z 1 ∈ S t0 (F t0−1 ) and Taking the conditional expectation with respect to F t0 we arrive at
since all Z i are conditional densities. Taking conditional expectation with respect to F t0−2 we get Z 0 = 1, hence
and we see that property (4.11) is fulfilled.
Regarding sufficiency, it has been shown so far that if condition (4.11) is valid for all t, then information monotonicity is not disturbed when F t0 is replaced by F t0−1 . If in addition all the mappings A t are information monotone in the sense of Definition 3.2, then all the factors in the products, and hence the products themselves are information antitone. Hence, if F t0 is replaced by F with
This results in
for any Y, which completes the proof that condition (4.11) is sufficient for information monotonicity.
Two simple but fundamental cases of compositions show how the above results can be used. 
is information monotone in a trivial way. Although this is evident, one may also evoke Proposition 4.1, since the conditional expectation has the conjugate representation
i.e. S t (F t ) = {1}. Therefore, condition (4.11) is fulfilled. 
which is the conditional version of the essential infimum, is information monotone: let F ⊆ F. Then we have
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Note that in both cases, Examples 4.1 and 4.2, information monotonicity is not strict. The expectation and compositions of essential infima are extreme cases of a broad spectrum of compositions with conjugate representation
where a t ∈ R, b t ∈ R ∪ {+∞}. These mappings can also be represented as
where α t = 1−at bt−at . For the expectation we have a t = b t = 1, while the essential infimum is given by a t = 0, b t = ∞. Clearly, with a t = 0 and b t = 1 α this class also contains any AV@R α .
One could ask the question, whether it is possible to compose any member of this family. The answer is no, as the following corollary shows. (i) Any occurence of a conditional essential infimum can be preceded by any mapping A t−1 that fulfills (4.12). (ii) Any other mapping A t than the essential infimum must be preceded by a conditional expectation.
Proof. The individual mappings are information monotone, hence Proposition 4.1 can be applied. We have
If the composition is information monotone then (4.6) is valid. Hence the following two equations, If we consider mappings with finite b t < ∞, the four equations (4.16)-(4.19) reduce to the alternative 21) and, bearing in mind E [Z t |F t−1 ] = 1, we have in both cases S t−1 (F t−1 ) = {1}. This shows A t−1 (·|·) = E[·|·], see case (ii) above. If b t = ∞, inequality 4.17 becomes obsolete and the other inequalities reduce to the alternative
The first case (a t = 0) shows that a t−1 , b t−1 can be chosen arbitrarily, if A t is the conditional essential infimum (see (i) above). The second case shows that S t−1 (F t−1 ) = {1} is allowed as the supergradient hull of A t−1 for arbitrary a t (see (ii) above).
We show now that information monotonicity is preserved under conditions (1), (2) above. Select any Z t+1 from S t (F t ) and Z t from S t−1 (F t − 1). Then
holds for the product. In the first case (i) we have a t = 0 and b t = ∞, and (4.24) reduces to 0 ≤ Z t · Z t+1 . In the second case (ii) we have a t−1 = 1 and b t−1 = 1. Here (4.24) reduces to 0 ≤ a t ≤ Z t · Z t+1 ≤ b t . Hence in both cases the first constraint of S t (F t−1 ) is fulfilled for the product M = Z t · Zt + 1. Furthermore, due to E [Z t |F t−1 ] = 1, it can be seen easily that the product also fulfills the second constraint of
Also within the following important class, compositions of conditional distortion mappings, information monotonicity can not be attained easily.
Corollary 4.2. Let A be a composition of regular distortion functionals A 1 , . . . , A T −1 . If at least one of the functionals A t , t < T − 2, is not the conditional expectation, then A is not information monotone.
Proof. As is shown in Appendix A, (6.2) for regular distortion functionals Since supergradients exist in the interior of the domain, there are functions Z such that the equality sign holds for every k. Suppose that A t−1 is not the conditional expectation. We show that condition (4.6) is violated. Let c k,t = 1 0
Let Z t−1 ∈ S t−1 (F t−1 ) and Z t ∈ S t (F t ) such that the equality sign holds in (4.25) .
Hence condition (4.6) is violated.
From the previous Corollaries it can be seen that a composition of AV@R αt 's can only be information information monotone if the vector (α 1 , . . . , α T ) is of the form (1, . . . , 1, α t , 0, . . . , 0). Functionals of the form E A T −1 T t=1 Y t |F T −1 play a special role with respect to information monotonicity. Clearly, such functionals are information monotone, if the mapping A T −1 is information monotone in the sense of Definition 3.2. In the end of section 5 we will give a sufficient condition for general compositions of similar type type (SEC functionals).
Another interesting example is the following mapping, which is closely related to MaxLoss-functional defined in [4] : the MinWin-functional can be interpreted as the minimum expected revenue under a generalized stress testing scenario -the worst distribution which is close to a given base line distribution with respect to the Kullback-Leibler divergence. The supergradient at Y is
.
(4.28)
For the nesting of two MinWin functionals, one has to look at condition (4.6). Notice that
In the light (4.28) it is possible to choose densities Z * 1 and Z * 2 in a way such that
This result shows that M * / ∈ S t (F ): the inequality
is not satisfied, because of K 2 > 0. Therefore the composition of MinWin functionals is not information monotone.
Compositions of non-homogeneous acceptability functionals
Consider now additive compositions A of mappings A 0 , . . . , A T −1 of the form 
with supergradient hull S t (F) for a given σ-field F. Assume that each positively homogeneous mapping
is information monotone, and the sets S t (·) fulfill the condition
for every t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and every pair of σ-fields F , F such that F ⊆ F. Assume further that there are representations
for t = 1, . . . T such that all f t are measurable functions, and all A t are compound concave conditional mappings. If in addition the inequality
holds for any nonnegative martingale (M t−1 , M t , M t+1 ) with E [M t ] = 1 and for t = 2, . . . , T , then the composition A is information monotone. If any of the inequalities involved is strict for at least one t = 1, . . . , T , then the mapping is strictly information monotone.
Proof. By (3.13) we have
for a given process Y related to the filtration F. Now we distinguish two cases. (i) Consider a filtration F = F 0 , . . . , F T , where (at some point in time t 0 ) F t0 is replaced by a σ-field F t0 with F t0−1 ⊂ F t0 ⊆ F t0 , and all other σ-fields F t , t = t 0 remain unchanged. Define a modified optimization problem Note that the objective function remains unchanged, while the sets S t are built w.r.t. F . Using (5.3) and information monotonicity of (5.2) it is easily possible to extend the arguments related to the sufficiency part of Proposition 4.1, which results in
Because A * is an infimum, for any ε > 0 it is possible to select a
Applying compound concavity we get
, which implies
(ii) Consider now a filtration F = F 0 , . . . , F T , where -at some time t 0 -F t0 is replaced by F t0 = F t0−1 . All other σ-fields F t , t = t 0 remain unchanged. This only works for processes where Y t0 is measurable w.r.t. F t0−1 . Otherwise A(Y, F ) = −∞ and information monotonicity is fulfilled in a trivial way. Hence the composition can be represented as 
and shows that with 
It follows that compositions of entropic mappings are information monotone, if γ t ≥ γ t−1 for all t.
An important class of multi-period valuation functionals are separable expected conditional (SEC) functionals. It shows that they are both, time consistent and information monotone.
Based on conditional acceptability mappings A t (·|F t ) with conjugates A + t (·|F t ) they are constructed ( [26] ) as follows: 
hence the conjugate of SEC functionals is also SEC.
Although they are no additive compositions, SEC functionals can be constructed recursively and hence are time consistent. It should be noted that the family of information monotone functionals is closed under addition, because it forms a convex cone (see Lemma 3.1 Consider the simple acceptability compositions
We may apply our theorem with 
This is the representation as a SEC functional only if 
Conclusions
We defined the notion of information monotonicity for multi-period acceptability type valuation functionals and argued for the importance of this concept, especially in economic decision making. After discussing the connections to multi-stage The main results -Propositions 4.1 and 5.1 -answer the question, under which additional requirements additive compositions can be information monotone. It shows that the domains of their conjugate mappings play a key role for answering this question.
• For compositions of positively homogeneous mappings with monotone behavior of their supergradient hulls, the restrictive condition (4.6) is necessary and sufficient. An important example -showing the severity of this condition -is given by compositions of distortion functionals, which reduce to the only feasible case of iterative application of conditional expectations or essential infima.
• If the composition contains mappings that are not positively homogeneous, only a sufficient condition is known so far. The same conditions as in the positively homogeneous case hold for the supergradient hull. In addition the conjugate functional has to fulfill a condition, representable by a certain compound concave construction (5.4) for the case F t−1 ⊂ F t ⊂ F t , and a monotonicity condition (5.5) for the case F t = F t−1 . Only certain compositions of mappings representable as SEC functionals are known to fulfill this requirements so far.
The results show that time consistency and information monotonicity can not easily be combined for multi-period-valuation functionals, although a nontrivial intersection, in particular SEC functionals, exists. Clearly, this comes from the fact that both time consistency and information monotonicity are considerably strong requirements. In concrete situations one always has to consider which property might be more important. Despite the fact that time consistency (recursivity) allows for dynamic programming, practitioners often might prefer information monotonicity, because usually, their estimated models and the related decisions have to be revised in the light of new data. Following [17] , we show the formula for a two-period composition, the generalization to arbitrary T is obvious. In the following, all the infima must be understood with respect to the constraints Z 2 ≥ 0, E [Z 2 |F 1 ] = 1, and Z 1 ≥ 0; E [Z 1 |F 0 ] = 1. For simplicity of notation, we write A t (·) for A t (·|F t ), t = 1, 2. Based on
we get
Here we have used that Since the infimum is attained, there is a Z Y2 such that
which shows (7.1).
